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Abstract  
 
On 8th November, 2016, Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi announced the demonetization 
of all ₹500 (approx. USD 7) and ₹1,000 (approx. USD 14) denominations of banknotes of the 
Mahatma Gandhi Series issued by the Reserve Bank of India. Overnight, 86% of the currency in 
circulation was cancelled in an economy where 80% of transactions are cash based. The goal 
behind this scheme was two-fold – to reduce corruption and black money in the Indian Economy, 
as well as to increase financial inclusion and create a more digitalized economy. In this paper, I 
look at the impact of this scheme on the digitization effects across the country. Using data from 
the Reserve Bank of India website – value and volume of ATM and Point of Sale transactions 
before, during and after demonetization – I use an Interrupted Time Series design to analyze   
impact.  Relative to the pre-event trend, I find a significant increase in value and volume of point 
of sale transactions after the immediate announcement, and a significant decline in value and 
volume of ATM transactions for the same period.  
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
The Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, was elected in 2014, when the Bhartiya Janata 
Party (BJP) won the Indian General Elections. Once in power, he proclaimed a national mission 
of financial inclusion, and subsequently on August 15th, India’s Independence Day, announced 
the Pradhan Mantri’s Jan-Dhan Yojana – the Prime Minister’s People’s Wealth Program – which 
envisioned bank accounts for all Indians. The program was formally launched on August 28th 
2014, and on the first day of the program itself, more than 15 million accounts were added, the 
largest ever recorded accounts to be opened in a single day in economic history.1  
In conjunction with his goal of financial inclusion, as well as the primary goal of the war 
against black money, on November 8th 2016, Modi announced India’s best kept secret: the 
demonetization or “withdrawal of Legal Tender Status” of ₹500 (approx. USD 7) and ₹1,000 
(approx. USD 14) denominations of banknotes of the Mahatma Gandhi Series issued by the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI, analogous with Federal Reserve in the US). This meant that 
overnight, over 86% of the currency in circulation was cancelled in an economy where 80% of 
transactions are cash based as noted by Shirley (2017). 
However, this did not mean that the notes were now worthless. People had the 
opportunity to exchange their old notes for up to 50 days (December 30th 2016) after the 
announcement. Thereafter, the old notes would be worthless. If the amount being deposited was 
below ₹250,000 (approx. USD 4,000), the depositor was not required to explain where the funds 
came from, and whether tax had been paid on them. Further, anyone depositing over ₹50,000 
(approx. USD 800) would need to have a KYC (Know Your Customer) compliant bank account, 
 
1 Asia-PacificIndia. “Financial Inclusion in India: Moving Beyond Bank Accounts.” Knowledge@Wharton, 
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/financial-inclusion-india-aims-move-beyond-bank-accounts/. 
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which is linked to the PAN (Personal Account Number) which is the central database for the 
taxation department.2  
The rules for depositing old notes changed almost every day after the announcement, 
leading to immense confusion amongst the general population. Initially, the RBI allowed banks 
to exchange old note of up to ₹4,000 (approx. USD 55) over-the-counter at any bank branch or 
post office, but a week later revised the amount to ₹4,500 (approx. USD 62). Requisition forms 
and valid ID proof were required for these transactions. Similarly, the ATM withdrawal limits 
were revised from ₹2,000 to ₹4,000 per day per card.3   
Singh and Mittal (2017) define demonetization as “The act of stripping a currency unit of 
its status as legal tender. Demonetization is necessary, whenever there is a change of national 
currency. The old unit of currency must be retired and replaced with a new currency unit.” 
Dhammika et al (2018) note that the provision of new currency notes makes the demonetization 
in reality a “re-monetization.” However, since most of the literature summarizing the events 
refers to the event as “demonetization,” I will do the same.  
The Press Release issued by the Reserve Bank of India (Figure 1) regarding the matter 
states that the move was “…necessitated to tackle counterfeiting Indian banknotes, to effectively 
nullify black money hoarded in cash and curb funding of terrorism with fake notes.” The Press 
Release also lays out the stipulations with regards to depositing old notes, and ATM transactions. 
In two more press releases on the same day, the government also introduced a new version of the 
 
2 Dharmapala, Dhammika and Khanna, Vikramaditya S., Stock Market Reactions to India's 2016 Demonetization: 
Implications for Tax Evasion, Corruption, and Financial Constraints (October 26, 2017). CESifo Working Paper 
Series No. 6707. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3079391 
 
3 Nair, Vishwanath. “RBI Notifications on Demonetisation since 8 November.” Https://Www.livemint.com, 8 Dec. 
2016, https://www.livemint.com/Industry/WWhlfsa3RUvtFmOTvAAAHJ/RBI-notifications-on-demonetisation-
since-8-November.html. 
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₹500 note, and introduced a higher denomination banknote of ₹2,000 (approx. USD 28). (See 
Figure 1 and 2).  
India is not the only country to have demonetized its currency. Several other countries 
have conducted such a scheme in the past, including the United Kingdom in 1971, Ghana in 
1982, Nigeria in 1984, Australia in 1996, Zimbabwe in 2015 and Pakistan in 2016.4 Further, this 
was not India’s first instance of demonetization. Banknotes were previously demonetized in 
1946 and 1978 (See Table 1). The reasoning behind the previous two demonetizations were 
similar; to tackle the hordes of black money in circulation. According to a report by the Times of 
India (a leading newspaper in the country), currency notes worth ₹47 crore (approx. USD 6.5 
million) were deposited across India during the 1948 demonetization.5 As noted in Table 1, in 
the 1946 and 1978 demonetizations, only the highest denomination notes were demonetized, 
which did not have as detrimental an effect on the general population as compared to the 2016 
demonetization which targeted moderately valued banknotes.   
The surprise element of the demonetization lends us a unique opportunity to test the 
effects of it in the aftermath. In particular, I am looking at the impact of the event on total value 
and volume of ATM and Point of Sale (PoS) transactions as a measure of digitization growth in 
India. In order to do this, I look at the trend of these four variables from September 2012 – 
November 2015, and then compare the disrupted trend line to the original. I use an Interrupted 
 
4 Agarwal, Sumit and Basu, Debarati and Ghosh, Pulak and Pareek, Bhuvanesh and Zhang, Jian, Demonetization 
and Digitization (December 24, 2018). Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3197990 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3197990 
 
5 Doctor, V. (2016, November 12). The cycles of demonetisation: A looks back at two similar experiments in 1946 
and 1978. Retrieved from https://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/onmyplate/the-cycles-of-demonetisation-
alooks-back-at-two-similar-experiments-in-1946-and-1978/ 
8 
 
Time Series framework to guide the analysis, but continue to monitor the variables for 28 months 
after the event.  
The next section (Section 2) comprises of the reactions and initial impact and Section 3 is 
a literature review of demonetization in conjunction with digitization. Section 4 consists of the 
data, and reviews the methodology employed. Lastly, Section 5 presents and explains the results, 
and Section 6 concludes the paper.    
 
Section 2: Demonetization: Initial Impact  
On November 8, 2016, around 8 PM Indian Standard Time, Prime Minister Modi gave an 
unscheduled address on live national television wherein he informed the country that from 
midnight onwards the ₹500 and ₹1,000 banknotes would no longer be considered legal tender, 
and would have no further monetary value.  
The scale of this decision was nothing like the country had experienced before. As 
mentioned above, India is an extremely cash dependent society, which led to an intense rush 
among citizens to deposit old notes, exchange them for new ones, or withdraw within the 
permissible limit. (Dr. B. S.  Kadam, 2017). People with excessive non-taxed cash began using 
different evasion techniques to deposit their cash without being targeted by the tax authorities. 
Kotwani (2017) notes that multiple branches of Axis Bank found bank officials involved in 
money laundering acts, such as exchanging old notes for gold. The Indian Railways observed a 
surge in the number of people booking tickets in classes 1A and 2A (equivalent to travelling first 
class via train), for the longest distance possible. They would pay with old notes in order to get 
rid of unaccounted cash, and subsequently cancel their tickets to receive a refund with the new 
notes. The Railway Ministry responded swiftly, ordering that cash refund for cancellation of 
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tickets will not be allowed above ₹5,000 from Nov 16th – Nov 24th, a decision that yielded 
immediate results, as the number of bookings nearly halved post the announcement.6 
Amid this frenzy, there was one big winning sector: Financial Technology companies. 
Due to the severe cash crunch, a large number of people began turning to digital wallets that can 
be used in conjunction with mobile payment systems allowing one to make payments using their 
smartphones. These companies saw an unprecedented surge in the number of people signing up 
for their services, and using them to pay for purchases.7 “Paytm’s traffic increased by 435%, app 
downloads grew 200%, and there was a 250% rise in overall transactions and transaction value.”8 
In February 2017, the firm announced an investment of ₹6 billion over the next 10 months to 
expand its QR-based payment network along with plans to add 10m merchants enabled with 
these codes.9 
 
Section 3: Demonetization: Literature Review 
A recent literature on the 2016 Indian demonetization examines the impact of 
demonetization on the usage of payment instruments in the country. M. Nithin, P. Jijin and P. 
Baiju (2018) use monthly data from April 2011 to December 2017 from the Reserve Bank of 
 
6 Manthank Mehta, and Tnn. “Railways Sets Rs 5000 as Cash Refund Limit for Tickets: Mumbai News - Times of 
India.” The Times of India, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Rlys-sets-5000-as-cash-refund-limit-
for-tickets/articleshow/55444673.cms. 
 
7 Alam, Nafis, and University of Reading. “Demonetisation in India: Success or Failure?” World Economic Forum, 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/02/demonetisation-in-india-success-or-failure. 
 
8 “Mobile Wallets See a Soaring Growth Post-Demonetisation.” Hindustan Times, 1 Jan. 2017, 
https://www.hindustantimes.com/business-news/mobile-wallets-see-a-soaring-growth-post-demonetisation/story-
zwdBi3UGqG1qZD92AEF9GK.html. 
 
9 Verma, Shrutika. “Paytm to Invest Rs600 Crore over 10 Months to Expand QR Code Payment 
System.” Https://Www.livemint.com, Livemint, 19 Feb. 2017, 
https://www.livemint.com/Companies/ZyhXWMzPE3fzK5q27bJi5I/Paytm-to-invest-Rs600-crore-over-10-months-
to-expand-QR-code.html. 
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India’s website to measure this impact. The variables used are total value of card transactions, 
total value of point of sale (PoS) transactions, the total value of ATM transactions, the total value 
of mobile transactions (including mobile wallet and mobile banking transactions) and the total 
value of Immediate Payment Services (IMPS) transactions. They analyze these variables using 
the method of Intervention Analysis in Time Series, which refers to how the mean level of a 
series changes after an intervention. They find that “while the usage of cards for transactions as a 
percentage of total transactions has increased, the share of point of sale (PoS) and mobile 
transactions has registered a decline after demonetization.” Further, they conclude that 
demonetization has had a “negative net unfavorable impact on digitalization,” and suggest 
“further improvements in infrastructure and policy environment for the promotion of digital 
transactions.”  
Agarwal, Basu, Ghosh, Pareek and Zhang (2018) analyze four large proprietary datasets 
on consumption and payment patters to analyze how demonetization impacted digitization in the 
Indian Economy. From the supply side, they look at debit card and e-wallet users and find an 
increase in debit card usage post-demonetization particularly at retail PoS machines and on e-
wallets. They find an 82% rise in the amount of money added to the e-wallet, 745% growth in 
person-to-person transfers to individuals and a 405% increase in person-to-person transfer to 
retailers.  
Agarwal et al. (2018) further note that demographic characteristics like age, marital status 
and the exiting level of digitization and infrastructure for adoption of digital means have a 
significant impact on the magnitude and persistence of the demonetization effect. They analyzed 
the heterogeneity in spatial and individual response to the consumption shock to provide these 
additional insights.  
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Krishnan (2019) conducted a study where approximately 200 low income families living 
in 28 slums of Mumbai were surveyed post-demonetization. The study finds 31% of respondents 
reporting that they lost at least some income by the end of November. The decrease was more 
drastic for daily wage labor and self-employed individuals (taxi drivers, auto rickshaw drivers). 
Further, 8% of the families report a difference in the mode of payments they used in November. 
Of those 8%, 54% used debit cards and 12% used cheques. Finally, 80% of the families report 
that they are aware of at least one cashless payment method – debit cards being the most frequent 
mention, followed by PayTM. 54% of the surveyed families also reported a reduction in 
household expenses for the month of November. 
My study analyzes data from September 2012 – August 2019, a period of time which has 
not been looked at yet within the Interrupted Time Series framework, and thus provides unique 
insights regarding transaction technologies for 3 years after the event. It helps us understand 
consumer behavior in the larger population as the dataset is from the RBI website, and 
incorporates most major banks in India. This is in contrast to studies like those of Krishnan 
(2019) mentioned above, which focus on a very specific socio-economic class of people. Further, 
it informs us of the comparison between the nature of ATM and PoS transactions before and 
after demonetization.  
 
Section 4: Data Description 
 The data used in the study is from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) website and is 
monthly data from September 2012 – August 2019 (under the “Payment System Indicators” 
section from the RBI Bulletin). The data comprises value and volume of ATM and Point of Sale 
(PoS) transactions from the aforementioned time period. These transactions are listed as subparts 
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under Credit Cards and Debit Cards, as millions of Rupees for Volume, and billions of Rupees 
for Value. For each month, I add the volume of transactions at ATMs using credit cards, and 
using debits cards to get the total volume of ATM transactions for the month. I perform the same 
exercise to obtain the total value of ATM transactions, total volume of PoS transactions, and 
total value of PoS transactions. In total, I have 84 monthly observations for each of the four 
variables, over the 2012-2019 period.  
 A PoS transaction refers to the moment where a transaction is finalized or the moment 
where a customer tenders payment in exchange for goods and services.10 In this case, the total 
number of PoS transactions refers to the total transactions made at by either credit or debit cards. 
ATM transactions refer to withdrawals, or deposits of cash made at an ATM using a credit or 
debit card.   
 This data is divided into the estimation period, event period and non-event period. The 
estimation period consists of data from September 2012 – October 2015, equaling 38 months. 
The event period consists of data from November 2015 – April 2017, equaling 18 months, and 
the event date is November 2016. The non-event period consists of data from May 2017 – 
August 2019, equaling 28 months.  Summary statistics for the 4 variables appear in Table 2.  
 
Section 4.1: Methodology 
I use the Interrupted time series (ITS) methodology to analyze the impact of 
demonetization on the value and volume of ATM and PoS transactions. Bernal, Cummins, & 
Gasparrini (2017) note that this study design is particularly suited to interventions that are 
introduced over a clearly defined time period and impact the population as a whole. “In the past, 
 
10 Lightspeed. “Your Ultimate Guide to Point of Sale Systems.” Lightspeed POS, Lightspeed POS, 8 Nov. 2019, 
https://www.lightspeedhq.com/blog/what-is-a-pos-purchase-and-other-pos-term-clarifications/. 
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it has been used to evaluate a wide range of public health interventions including new vaccines, 
cycle helmet legislation, changes to paracetamol packaging, traffic speed zones and precautions 
against nosocomial infections, as well as in the evaluation of health impacts of unplanned events 
such as the global financial crisis.” 11 Typically, a time series of a particular outcome of interest 
is used to establish an underlying trend, which is subsequently interrupted by an intervention at a 
specific, known point in time (Bernal et al 2017). 
I use the estimation period (September 2012 – October 2015) to create trend lines for the 
4 variables, using the following regression equations: 
PoS_Value = β0 + β1t + u 
PoS_Vol = β0 + β1t + u 
ATM_Value = β0 + β1t + u 
ATM_Vol = β0 + β1t + u 
t ϵ Estimation Period 
 Where t represents the number of the observation (September 2012 = 1, October 2012 = 2 
and so on). Table 5 displays the main results of these regressions i.e. the estimated intercept and 
estimated slope coefficients along with their standard errors for the 4 variables – PoS_Value, 
PoS_Vol, ATM_Value and ATM_Vol. 
 In Figure 4 and 5, we can observe that the trend and the actuals of both value and volume 
of transactions are extremely close together, moving along almost the same trajectory. However, 
at the time of the event (8th November 2016) there is a large increase in PoS transaction volume 
and value, and large decline in ATM transaction value and volume. The decline in ATM 
 
11 Bernal, James Lopez, et al. “Interrupted Time Series Regression for the Evaluation of Public Health Interventions: 
a Tutorial.” International Journal of Epidemiology, Oxford University Press, 1 Feb. 2017, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5407170/. 
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transactions however, is also in part due to the fact that ATMs were being recalibrated to 
dispense the new ₹2,000 note, which is larger in size than all previous notes in circulation. 12 
Modi also announced that ATMs would be closed country wide on 9th November and in some 
places on 10th November too.13 
 I then use the following regression to evaluate the stability of the trend post event: 
PoS_Value = β0 + β1t 
+ ∂01{t ≤ T* -12} + ∂11{t ≤ T* -12}t 
+ α01{t ≥ T* + 6} + α11{t ≥ T* + 6}t + u 
The regression equations for all other variables (PoS_Vol, ATM_Value and ATM_Vol) 
have similar specifications.  
β0 and β1t capture the intercept and trend for the event period (November 2015 – April 
2017), ∂0 and ∂1 capture the intercept and trend for the non-event period (May 2017 – August 
2019), and α0 and α1 capture the intercept and trend for the estimation period (September 2012 – 
October 2015) and how it differs from the full non-event window.   
The stability hypothesis is that if the trend is stable post-event, then demonetization has 
not had a significant, long term impact on the growth of ATM or PoS transactions. I test this by 
evaluating the following: 
Ho: ∂0 = α0 
And 
∂1 = α1 
 
12 “Cash Chaos after Shock Move Targeting India's ‘Black Money.’” CBS News, CBS Interactive, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/india-demonetization-narendra-modi-lines-for-cash-banks-atm-machines/. 
 
13 “Why ATMs Are Struggling Under the Pressures of Demonetisation.” The Wire, https://thewire.in/banking/atms-
struggling-pressures-demonetisation. 
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(Estimation Window Model = Post Event Model)  
 
Estimation Window Model = (β0 + ∂0) + (β1 + ∂1)t + u  
Post Event Model = (β0 + α0) + (β1 + α1)t + u 
 The salient regression results containing coefficients and standard errors for ∂0, ∂1, α0 and 
α1 can be found in Table 4. The full regression results can be found in Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
 
Section 5: Results 
 In Figure 6, we observe that the volume of ATM transactions has decreased by 
approximately 20% at the time of demonetization, and then settles back into its original trend 
with a permanent shift of approximately 10 – 15 %. 
 For PoS transactions, the volume of transactions increases by approximately 90% due to 
demonetization, and then settles back into its original trend with a permanent shift of 
approximately 35 – 40 %. 
 Transaction values for both variables display similar deviations. For ATM transactions, 
the value decreases by approximately 100% due to demonetization, and then settles back into the 
trend with a permanent shift of approximately 15 – 20 %. 
 For PoS, the value of transactions increases by approximately 70% due to demonetization 
and then settles back into the trend with a permanent shift of approximately 40%.  
 These findings are consistent with the previously mentioned study by Nithin, Jijin and 
Baiju (2018) in which they observe a fall in the value of transactions at ATM’s in the immediate 
month post demonetization. They also observe that though the value of PoS transactions 
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increased sharply immediately following demonetization, it decreased thereafter but the fall is 
not statistically significant. 
 In Table 4 we observe that evaluating the estimation window post event period shows 
that there is a statistically significant difference in trend from the estimation window to the post 
event window, but the estimated magnitude of the difference is extremely small.  
 
Section 6: Conclusion 
The decision by PM Modi on 8th November 2016 to demonetize the currency notes of 
₹500 (approx. USD 7) and ₹1,000 (approx. USD 14) became one of the most widely discussed 
and debated topics that divided economists and politicians on its merits. To this day, people have 
divided views on whether it accomplished its goals.  
Wade Shepard of Forbes notes that prior to demonetization, upwards of 95% of 
transactions were made in cash – even Uber, Ola and major websites accepted cash as payment 
options.14 This decision by the Prime Minister impacted the lives of Indians in a way that had 
never been seen before, especially the way in which they conducted transactions and made 
payments.  
To examine the depth of this impact on payment digitization, I looked at value and 
volume of ATM and Point of Sale transactions from September 2012 – August 2019 and used 
the estimation period to create trends for the variables. In the results, we can observe a sharp 
decline in value and volume of ATM transactions immediately after the event, but this effect 
 
14 Shepard, Wade. “How India Is Surviving Post-Demonetization.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 31 July 2017, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/07/29/how-india-is-surviving-post-
demonetization/#2466ada21164. 
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does not persist, and soon settles back into the original trend, with a permanent shift of 15-20 % 
for value of ATM transactions and 10-15 % for volume.  
For PoS transactions, we find a sharp incline in value and volume immediately after the 
event, and similar to ATM transactions, this effect does not persist over a longer period. The 
volume of transactions settles back into its original trend with a permanent shift of approximately 
35-40 %. The value of transactions eventually settles back into the trend with a permanent shift 
of approximately 40%. 
As an aside, I think India is in an excellent position to benefit from FinTech disruption 
because the country did not have much in the way of legacy banking assets that more mature 
economies are stuck with. Instead they are positioned to create new efficient institutions based 
on digital technologies and mobile apps that can generate more efficient disintermediation.  
According to the Ernst and Young FinTech Adoption Index 2017, money transfer and payments 
as a sub-domain has the highest consumer adoption rate globally at 50%, with India leading the 
way at an impressive 72%.15 
While this study has helped us understand consumer patterns around transaction 
technology post demonetization, it does not account for immediate mobile payment services, 
financial technology company transactions (like PayTm), and hence is limited in its scope. In 
terms of how the 2016 demonetization impacted the role of digital payments in India, based on 
the study I think the country is off to a start, but still has a long way to go to achieve the goal of 
complete financial inclusion.  
 
 
 
15 Www.ey.com. https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-the-battle-for-the-indian-consumer/$File/ey-the-
battle-for-the-indian-consumer.pdf. 
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History of Demonetization Experiments in India  
 
Year  Demonetized Notes Goals  Results 
1948 ₹ 1,000 and ₹ 10,000 
notes were withdrawn. 
Reintroduced in 1954.  
World War II: 
Businessmen were 
supposed to have made 
huge fortunes supplying 
the Allied War effort and 
were concealing their 
profits from the tax 
department.  
The higher demonetized 
notes were not accessible to 
common people at the time 
so it did not have a large 
impact on the economy. 
1978 ₹ 1,000, ₹ 5,000 and ₹ 
10,000 notes were 
withdrawn. 
A political angle prompted 
the ban as the newly 
formed Janata government 
wanted to target some of 
the alleged corrupt 
elements in the 
government. 
The impact on common 
people was limited as the 
demonetized notes formed 
only a small portion of the 
total money supply.  
Table 1 
Source: Singh, Charan, (2018) “India Since Demonetisation,” IIM Bangalore Research Paper 
No. 567. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3151238 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3151238 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PoS_value 84 527.1985 334.0285 150.11 1189.1 
ATM_value 84 2115.287 487.0497 850.22 3143.04 
PoS_vol 84 266.3469 177.9149 67.35 608.343 
ATM_vol 84 663.8249 118.9069 444.17 915.19 
Table 2 
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 Estimated Intercept Estimated Slope Coefficient 
PoS_Value 
Standard Error 
5.07032 
(0.02092) 
0.01924 
(0.000934792916752955) 
PoS_Vol 
Standard Error 
4.24659 
(0.01923) 
0.02153 
(0.00086) 
ATM_Value 
Standard Error 
7.23749 
(0.01443) 
0.01135 
(0.00065) 
ATM_Vol 
Standard Error 
6.11584 
(0.01049) 
0.01022 
(0.00047) 
Table 3 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
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 PoS_Value PoS_Volume ATM_Value ATM_Volume 
∂0 
Standard Error 
1.798012 
(.2948838) 
2.115001 
(.3112152) 
-1.201303 
(.455789) 
-.6206596 
(.1375019) 
∂1  
Standard Error 
-.0337264 
(.0063574) 
-.040196 
(.0070113) 
.0268616 
(.0106194) 
.0111089 
(.0028052) 
α0  
Standard Error 
-.3235704 
(.0808772) 
-.5266389 
(.0659482) 
.0003794 
(.0794731) 
.0437467 
(.0805959) 
α1  
Standard Error 
-.0011118 
(.0015122) 
.0018184 
(.001307) 
.0022153 
(.0012938) 
.001906 
(.0012758) 
F stat for H0 42.17 87.60 9.92 27.04 
P Value for H0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Table 4 
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Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
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Table 5 
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  2,    78) =   42.17
 ( 2)  alpha1 = 0
 ( 1)  alpha0 = 0
. test alpha0 alpha1
                                                                              
       _cons     3.595877    .284509    12.64   0.000     3.029463    4.162291
      alpha1    -.0011118   .0015122    -0.74   0.464    -.0041224    .0018988
      alpha0    -.3235704   .0808772    -4.00   0.000    -.4845845   -.1625562
      delta1    -.0337264   .0063574    -5.31   0.000    -.0463831   -.0210697
      delta0     1.798012   .2948838     6.10   0.000     1.210944    2.385081
      tbeta1      .054073   .0062629     8.63   0.000     .0416046    .0665415
                                                                              
 LogPoSValue        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                Root MSE          =     .08652
                                                R-squared         =     0.9836
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(5, 78)          =    1968.23
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =         84
. reg LogPoSValue tbeta1 delta0 delta1 alpha0 alpha1, robust
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Table 6 
            Prob > F =    0.0001
       F(  2,    78) =    9.92
 ( 2)  alpha1 = 0
 ( 1)  alpha0 = 0
. test alpha0 alpha1
                                                                              
       _cons     8.438418   .4490236    18.79   0.000     7.544481    9.332355
      alpha1     .0022153   .0012938     1.71   0.091    -.0003604    .0047911
      alpha0     .0003794   .0794731     0.00   0.996    -.1578395    .1585983
      delta1     .0268616   .0106194     2.53   0.013     .0057201    .0480032
      delta0    -1.201303    .455789    -2.64   0.010    -2.108709   -.2938971
      tbeta1    -.0177345   .0105601    -1.68   0.097     -.038758    .0032891
                                                                              
 LogATMValue        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                Root MSE          =      .1237
                                                R-squared         =     0.7603
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(5, 78)          =     360.08
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =         84
. reg LogATMValue tbeta1 delta0 delta1 alpha0 alpha1, robust
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Table 7 
 
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  2,    78) =   87.60
 ( 2)  alpha1 = 0
 ( 1)  alpha0 = 0
. test alpha0 alpha1
                                                                              
       _cons     2.658237   .3049894     8.72   0.000      2.05105    3.265424
      alpha1     .0018184    .001307     1.39   0.168    -.0007837    .0044204
      alpha0    -.5266389   .0659482    -7.99   0.000    -.6579316   -.3953462
      delta1     -.040196   .0070113    -5.73   0.000    -.0541544   -.0262377
      delta0     2.115001   .3112152     6.80   0.000      1.49542    2.734583
      tbeta1     .0599059   .0069561     8.61   0.000     .0460575    .0737544
                                                                              
   LogPoSVol        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                Root MSE          =     .09754
                                                R-squared         =     0.9823
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(5, 78)          =    2800.50
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =         84
. reg LogPoSVol tbeta1 delta0 delta1 alpha0 alpha1, robust
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Table 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  2,    78) =   27.04
 ( 2)  alpha1 = 0
 ( 1)  alpha0 = 0
. test alpha0 alpha1
                                                                              
       _cons     6.692744   .1118769    59.82   0.000     6.470014    6.915474
      alpha1      .001906   .0012758     1.49   0.139    -.0006339    .0044458
      alpha0     .0437467   .0805959     0.54   0.589    -.1167075    .2042009
      delta1     .0111089   .0028052     3.96   0.000     .0055242    .0166937
      delta0    -.6206596   .1375019    -4.51   0.000    -.8944049   -.3469143
      tbeta1    -.0028041   .0025394    -1.10   0.273    -.0078596    .0022514
                                                                              
   LogATMVol        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                Root MSE          =     .04878
                                                R-squared         =     0.9343
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(5, 78)          =     356.03
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =         84
. reg LogATMVol tbeta1 delta0 delta1 alpha0 alpha1, robust
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